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Introduction: social constructionism 
'I think we need a new (gulp) paradigm . . . of mental health and what it means 
to be a nurse. These are highly problematic concepts . . .' (Tony O'Brien, 
Auckland, NZ, Psychiatric Nursing Mailbase, 2000). 
Social constructionism, an interdisciplinary paradigm, has emerged from a 
crisis in the social sciences in the late 20th century (Gergen 1999). This crisis 
is around the failure of modernist values to help us understand, and achieve 
mastery over, the worlds we live around a number of cohering areas. These 
include 'grand narrative', 'imperialist' claims to the true nature of a supposed 
external reality (realism) and the true nature of something or someone 
(essentialism). Not surprisingly, suspicion has been increasingly accorded to 
related modernist assumptions of selves as rational agents, free to make 
choices and take direct action on the world. All of this has called into question 
the notion of individual consciousness as a reliable and adequate mirror of 
this world, with language as a nonproblematic, neutral and descriptive vehicle 
of representation. 
From a social constructionist perspective, language is constitutive of reality. If 
language has a performative, action-oriented function (Potter & Wetherell 
1987, Edwards & Potter 1992, Burr 1995), there is no need to assume a 'real 
world' separate from or existing prior to its linguistic construction (Burr 1995). 
The concepts we use in day-to-day interaction do not predate language but 
are made possible by it (Sapir 1947, Burr 1995). Language emerges as a 
possible battleground, where constructions of the what is, is not, or should be 
of life are contested, in a 'site of struggle, conflict and potential personal and 
social change' (Burr 1995, p. 44). 
Berger & Luckmann (1966) argue that the mechanism governing the genesis 
and maintenance of the successful social construction of reality is the process 
of externalization, objectification and internalization; to quote from Burr (1995, 
p. 10): 
'People "externalise" when they act on their world, creating some 
artefact or practice . . . [for example] . . . by telling a story or writing a 
book . . . this then enters into the social realm, and once in this . . . 
begins to take on a life of its own. The idea that it expresses has 
become an 'object' of consciousness for the people in that society . . . 
and has developed a kind of factual existence or truth . . . which 
appears . . . "natural", issuing from the nature of the world itself rather 
than dependent upon the constructive work and interactions of human 
beings . . . they "internalise" it as part of their consciousness . . .' 
The social construction of professional identity 
Within the shared project of the social construction of reality, dialoguing 
communities influence what is or is not done in social practice (Schutz 1980). 
This in turn reflects what it is or is not legitimate to talk about in the 
construction of reality. The way society is organized in social structure is 
achieved by this process, ultimately confirming and reifying what people say 
and write. By implication, the process involves the production of selfhood (Hall 
2000) and in related terms, for the purposes of this paper, professional and 
organizational identity. 
If accepted, the implications of the social construction of identity within 
organizational life are enormous. I will argue later for a positive implication for 
mental health nurses of a far greater conscious investment in relational 
politics. This could have a potential liberating function, in the process of 
resisting 'either–or' current forms of representation and the production of new 
constructions of organization and identity. However, for the moment it may be 
instructive to briefly look at more global, sinister implications. The insidious 
influence of hierarchical paternalism in meaning construction in the so-called 
'developed world' results in managed information, used in the circulation of 
accounts of (national) identity. What is asserted is less important than what is 
omitted, resulting in a public arguably 'groomed, rather than brainwashed' 
(Pilger 1998, p. 448). Pilger convincingly uncovers the process that leads 
many of us to be blind to the propaganda and censorship of the 'free world', 
because the exploitation and inhumanity perpetrated in the name of 
democracy is sanitized out of the journalistic soundbite. 
Although at first sight this may seem of little relevance to mental health 
nursing, we are reminded by Nader (1972) of the value of 'studying up' – 
exploring relationships between micro and macro social phenomena. In this 
vein, you don't have to be a conspiracy theorist to accept in principle that 
patriarchal influence serves to socially structure the organizations within which 
mental health nurses work, in turn influencing their sense of organizational 
'reality' and professional identity (Hearn 1993, Putnam & Mumby 1993, Hearn 
& Parkin 1999, Grant 2000). At the organizational symptomatic level, for 
example, there is good reason to suspect that the emotional, physical and 
sexual abuse of staff and patients alike in inpatient psychiatric units may be 
under-reported. If accepted as a reasonable suspicion, this may be because 
such abuse is inscribed within the social structuring of organizations, and is 
insufficiently arousing for many staff who have habituated to their own and 
others' distress (Ward 2000). In constructionist theoretical terms, it can be 
argued that the social process leading to the organization of inpatient 
treatment emerging as an acceptable arrangement over time creates the 
potential for abuse in the first place. 
Discursive practices, ideology and 'truth' 
The social construction of professional identity is relatively unstable, affected 
as it is by shifting time and social context. The 'taken for granted' realities of 
any one occupational group will mutate over the years as a function of the 
emergence of new discourses inseparable from, and constituting, fields of 
power. Discourses can be understood as 'practices which form the objects of 
which they speak' (Foucault 1972, p. 49), in other words grids of meaning 
through which we interpret and act upon our life-worlds. Discursive practices 
serve to provide the basis, parameters and boundaries of what can and 
cannot be spoken about. 
It follows that an important moral dimension of discursive practice is in the 
conferment of value on certain ways of constructing polarized professional 
world views, with reference to, and at the expense, others – for example, 'my 
view of mental health nursing is cool and evidence-based whereas yours is 
sentimental, pink and fluffy'. Dominant discourses, successful by dint of their 
performative and rhetorical effects, but tacitly claiming to represent 'the truth', 
as in all other aspects of life, silently 'hail' individuals to accept socially 
constructed accounts of life, and thus subjective, ideological, positions of one 
form of professional identity over another (Althusser 2000). Ideology in this 
context may be understood as 'attempts to simplify, to obscure or erase 
contradictions, to invert reality, to produce monoliths' (Hearn & Parkin 1999, p. 
148). By this process, constructions of professional identity thrive, wither or 
vie, one with the other, for a limited time. 
With the above theoretical framework in mind, it is useful at this point to 
critically, selectively and playfully explore some dominant discursive themes in 
contemporary British mental health nursing. Doing so will facilitate the 
identification of modernist ideological mechanisms at play in the relatively 
successful construction of current professional identities. 
Barker–Gournayism 
Just as the Berlin wall functioned as a positioning ideological divide for many 
years, Barker-Gournayism has emerged as two sides of one ideological coin. 
At first blush, those of us discursively positioned within it may be seen to 
belong to one of two opposed camps. However, the irony is that neither camp 
could exist independently, since the totalizing claims of either one both 
presuppose, and attempt to silence, the claims of the other (Derrida 1980). In 
so doing, the importance of the other's discursive position is proclaimed. Each 
camp is forced into what Gergen (1995) describes as an 'identity trap' that 
serves to confirm the other's sense of moral superiority. 
The meaning of Barker–Gournayism is not in the respective minds of either 
camp, nor in any kind of 'real world' which predates written or spoken 
communication, but is embedded within current relational and organizational 
scenarios (Gergen 1995). In an important sense, specifically because of the 
strength of the polarizing dialogue which has developed, an arguable effect 
may be of little apparent space left for alternative constructions of mental 
health nursing identity in some quarters. Individuals are, by default, forced into 
a pro or anti position. Either way, the parameters of the dialogue, constructed 
within the Barker–Gournay symbiosis, remain intact. 
In the 'culture war' (Gergen 1995) over the fundamental meaning of mental 
health nursing the social genesis of either view is effaced, and this 
strengthens tacit appeals to 'the truth' expressed in polarized terms. 
Consequently, a military metaphor emerges as appropriate for seeing more or 
less 'totally sold' individuals engage, rather predictably, in open combat. The 
battle of words in the 'nurse brutalist debate', for example, revealed the moral 
basis for the campaign: truth vied with falsehood, empirical respectability with 
qualitative waffle, defamatory character assassination with assertions of the 
deliberate use of irony for literary effect, and the Gournay camp's realism was 
attacked as an identity-trapping language game (Barker 1999, Cannon et al. 
1999, Clarke 1999, Duncan-Grant 1999, Ritter 1999, Rogers 1999, Stevenson 
1999; Clarke, personal communication) 
However, in the dialogic conflict, similarities exist between both camps, which 
are submerged under what appears to make each radically different from the 
other. While the content of the world view of each appears opposed, both 
sides, at worst, are guilty of ideological imperialism in essentializing mental 
health nursing. The strength of the ideological appeal of either side to 'hail' 
new subjects rest precisely in seductive language used in the organized 
construction of nursing identity. Implicit, but questionable, messages given by 
each camp are around mental health nurses' freedom to make rational 
choices in the development of professional identity. These may be gift 
wrapped in either seductive exhortations to transcend to the dizzy spiritual 
height that is, in a timeless sense, (nontechnical) mental health nursing, or 
'get real' in unpretentious, down-to-earth, empirically respectable, trans-
professional mental health practice. At worst, inevitably, these messages 
sanitize, mislead, falsely homogenize, gloss over, and fail to adequately 
contain and make sense of the difficulties and contradictions nurses will face 
in living up to the professional subjectivities proposed in either world view. A 
look at the November 2000 edition of Mental Health Practice, for example, 
illustrates the postmodern nightmare of contradictory messages that is new 
millennium inpatient mental health nursing: 
'. . . nurses on some wards are so overstretched they are unable to 
observe continually all patients who are identified as being at risk of 
suicide' (p. 3). 
'Mental health nurses should not be placed in situations in which their 
patients' human rights could be infringed' (p. 3). 
And, in relation to the inappropriate use of seclusion: 
'It is everyone's responsibility to be vigilant about the use of any 
restrictive nursing practices and to question our own use of such 
activities' (p. 9). 
As successful social construction, in the sense of achieving desired 
performative and rhetorical effects, Barker–Gournayism has, for many 
individuals, for too long served to conceal and marginalize other possibilities. 
These include broadening the dialogue to encompass different theoretical or 
conceptual 'takes' on mental health nursing identity or identities, to either 
supplement or challenge existing representations. Before turning to a tentative 
outline of some possible ways forward, it is worth considering the possible 
factors contributing to forms of organizational unwillingness to engage in new 
discourses of mental health nursing. The following section constitutes an 
incomplete and imperfect position around this question, but one that has 
some merit in resonating with the research and work experiences of myself 
and my colleagues in organizational life. 
Resistance 
Many contemporary mental health nurses cling firmly to Barker–Gournayism 
and other sacred cows, arguably because of the cultural strength of beliefs of 
rational individuals operating in rational organizations. Gergen (2000) argues 
that this process may occur because of the strength of world views which, 
although flawed, are firmly rooted in modernist assumptions which continue to 
hold sway. 
Modernist assumptions of rational individuals and organizations also, of 
course, inform research dialogues. Gournay et al.  (2000), for example, 
suggest that the reasons for the failure of cognitive behavioural 
psychotherapy to more significantly influence mental health nursing practice 
is, in large part, because of the failure of course leaders to convince service 
managers of its importance. Extremely naïve in organizational change terms, 
in making this claim these authors are of course falling into the 'myth of the 
hero innovator' trap. Individuals are set up for inevitable failure when and if 
charged to influence large-scale changes in the custom and practice of 
organizations (Georgiades & Phillimore 1975). 
Such claims also reflect the failure of educational and culture change 
stakeholders to consider the problem of the transfer from curriculum to 
organizational practice in sufficiently broad socio-cultural terms (Grant and 
Mills 2000, Tarrier 1999). In spite of current rhetorics of enterprise, where c. 
1940s organizations aspire to become successful mission statement cultures, 
bureaucracies arguably sustain socially constructed systems of custom and 
practice which inhibit and undermine large scale innovation (Pfeffer 1981). 
Why should psychiatric/mental health nurses – academic or clinical – be 
unwilling to critique the organization in the service of constructing new 
dialogues around professional identity? Broaden-ing the meaning of 
organizations from bricks and mortar to 'in the head' phenomena (Wright 
1994), the dominant discursive positions offered by Barker–Gournayism offer 
us existentially secure 'homes' (Yalom 1980, Fineman 1993). I have already 
argued above for the operation of organizational homeostasis in the 
maintenance of organizational custom and practice. To seriously deconstruct 
this may amount to revisioning the bureaucratic environments that mental 
health nurses work in as sites of multiple oppression (Hearn & Parkin 1999). 
This in turn could trigger off large-scale organizational existential insecurity 
(Fineman 1993), where the relative meaninglessness (Yalom 1980)  o f  
organizational life, and by implication professional identity, would come into 
sharp focus. 
It is indeed scary to reflect on the possibility that, at micro and macro levels, 
organizations are suspect. In the context of debates on professional identity, it 
is relatively unusual in mental health nursing dialogues to consider the 
possibility that organizations discursively socialize individuals to be – at worst 
– untrustworthy, or to become so inscribed within corporate narratives to 
forget that organizations could be different. Bureaucratic organizations 
socialize members to 'forget' that frontstage activity around public impression 
management, where convenient image-making masquerades as reality, belies 
much sinister backstage work (Goffman 1969). Supporting the views of Purser 
& Cabana (1998), what doesn't appear in the glossy broadsheets or mission 
statements are the hidden relational dynamics of conflict among functions or 
departments, power unrelated to knowledge or expertise influencing decision-
making, a lack of co-operative behaviour between powerful individuals and 
departments, combined with a reluctance to change or challenge existing 
practices and procedures. 
Not surprisingly, many organizations within which mental health nurses work 
have problems around learning from experience or learning about learning 
(Morgan 1997). This makes related, modernist-based discourses on 'self-
awareness' and 'reflective practice', both of which currently enjoy a cosy 
relationship with mental health nursing identity, seem like so much facile 
rhetoric. By implication, at both corporate and individual levels, serious 
reflection around professional identity of the type suggested by social 
(de)constructionist principles may be immensely threatening to Trusts and to 
mental health nurses equally. 
An outline of possible ways forward 
I have argued that meaning is embedded within relational scenarios and that, 
as a vehicle for making meaning, 'language is shaped neither by nature nor 
mind, but by (organised) relationship' (Gergen 1995, p. 7). I have further 
argued that in a reciprocal and dynamic way, written or spoken dialogue 
informs both social process and social structure. What then are the 
implications for the possible development of new forms of dialogue, social 
process and structure within mental health nursing? 
Broadly, the charge is for generic and specialist nurses to develop more 
critical theoretical positions within a new and emerging relational politics 
(Gergen 1995). It is timely for nurses to revision themselves in their writing 
and talking in ways that take account of sadly neglected factors influencing 
professional identity. Attaining critical repertoires will enable nurses to 
challenge current polarizing constructions around what is good/bad or 
right/wrong in contemporary mental health nursing practice, and to explore the 
relationship between micro- and macro-organizational influences on identity 
construction. Greater sensitization to the pragmatics of language will 
undermine notions of benign organizations and subject both those 
organizations and the conceptual, strategic and research rhetorics 
underpinning them to moral and political debate. 
More specifically, it may be timely for mental health nurses to develop 
incorporative, unifying, rather than either–or dialogues, where the sense in 
which our identities are 'constituted by and with others' (Gergen 1995, p. 10) 
is sympathetically acknowledged. We need to develop conversational 
resources that suspend the rhetoric of individual or group blame. By this 
means we could amicably explore common concerns, using conference 
devices such as taking the role of the other in playfully and respectfully 
engaging in each other's self-doubts and fears (Gergen 1995). Without 
implying a need for any kind of 'wooly eclecticism', doing so may help us 
develop more of a professional sense of ourselves as 'multiple-partials' 
(Gergen 1995, p. 11). It is indeed possible to be simultaneously inspired and 
moved by Barker's writing while respecting the significant contributions of 
Gournay, without being trapped in an either–or language game. A relational 
politics which is both diffused and defused – expanded into all corners of 
professional life and reduced in its aggressive, alienating posture – would 
move the sense of politics into the local and immediate through new forms 
spoken and written dialogue (Rolfe 2000). 
It may be helpful at this point to illustrate the relevance of the above 
suggestions with some specific and current examples of inertia problems in 
organized dialogue. In the psychiatric nursing mailbase, there seems good 
evidence to suggest that some individuals fear to engage in heated debates 
with thick-skinned contributors (Auld, personal communication). Those that do 
risk the possibility of anonymous abusive e-mails from some members if the 
current, unspoken and tacitly policed, discursive rules are broken (Fineman 
1993; Simpson, personal communication). 
At the terrestrial level of macro-organizational life, dominance of institutional 
monololiths is illustrated by two further examples, from nurse education and 
research, respectively. In generic mental health nurse education, the last 
vestiges of the 'monologic voice of authority' in the classroom or 'one right 
answer' approach need to be abandoned in favour of inviting students to 
consider and challenge the received opinions of authorities in the field – to 
effectively learn how to think critically. The risk for some stakeholders is that 
this may, inevitably, signal the death knell of humanism and the lone, 
reflective, rational agent aspiring to an imagined self-awareness, shifting the 
agenda to a much needed focus on forms of relationship in constructing 
meaning and identity. 
'Specialist' 'nurse' cognitive behavioural psychotherapy practitioners can and 
should challenge the research following up ENB 650 trained nurses. Despite 
the appearance of 'neutral' research, the combination of design choice and 
thinly disguised ideological commitment displayed in Gournay et al. (2000) 
paints a contestable picture of an homogenous advanced practitioner – the so 
called 'nurse behaviour therapist'. It has to be said that the Institute of 
Psychiatry ENB 650 course has broadened its curriculum in recent times to 
include more of an emphasis on the therapeutic relationship, cognitive case 
formulation, and a concern about the potential for organizational factors to 
negatively impact on practitioners. However, in spite of this, insufficient 
attention has been paid by Gournay and colleagues to the possibility that not 
all ENB 650 graduates accept the narrow client range, diagnostically led, form 
of behavioural-cognitive therapy expounded in past years by the London 
course. In the same vein, little attention is apparent in this research to the 
possibility that so-called 'nurse therapists' may inevitably develop in terms of 
incorporating different psychotherapeutic and sociocultural world views in their 
experiential and practice repertoire (Duncan-Grant 1999, Barker 2000; Tilley, 
personal communication). Similarities rather than differences are thus 
inevitably constructed within a, until recently, dominant 'party line' version of 
behavioural-cognitive nursing training and practice favoured at the Institute of 
Psychiatry, and the wisdom of deviance from this line is called into question. 
To end at the beginning 
We may be on the cusp of creating new possibilities for organizing our 
identities through dialogue. New organizations can develop, resistance to 
'forced' identities made explicit (hooks 1994), and hybrid forms nurtured and 
encouraged. To paraphrase George Kelly, psychiatric/mental health nurses 
need no longer be the victims of their (constructed) biographies. Morgan 
(1997) similarly reminds us that organizations (virtual, bricks and mortar, in 
the head, and culture war) within which mental health nurses currently find 
themselves inscribed, need to be exposed as 'psychic prisons'. No longer 
should we allow potential messages of identity change to decay, or be 
sabotaged in the cycle of current exchange that serves to maintain the status 
quo of organizational practice and safety 
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